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Strengths and limitations of this study
 ► First study to quantify anticipated food price chang-
es and associated uncertainty relating to Brexit Deal 
and No- deal scenarios using a transparent and es-
tablished protocol, and to articulate links to potential 
healthcare impacts.
 ► Inclusion of experts with broad and overlapping ar-
eas of expertise in food production and supply.
 ► Scenario analysis showing how price changes in 
linked food categories could combine to affect over-
all food costs.
 ► Fewer than optimal number of experts elicited.
 ► Study was undertaken on the assumption that Brexit 
would occur on 29 March 2019. Delays and major 
ambiguities with respect to eventual Brexit circum-
stances have emerged since experts made projec-
tions in 2018.
AbStrACt
Introduction Food insecurity is associated with increased 
risk for several health conditions and with poor chronic 
disease management. Key determinants for household 
food insecurity are income and food costs. Whereas 
short- term household incomes are likely to remain static, 
increased food prices would be a significant driver of food 
insecurity.
Objectives To investigate food price drivers for household 
food security and its health consequences in the UK under 
scenarios of Deal and No- deal for Britain’s exit from the 
European Union. To estimate the 5% and 95% quantiles of 
the projected price distributions.
Design Structured expert judgement elicitation, a well- 
established method for quantifying uncertainty, using 
experts. In July 2018, each expert estimated the median, 
5% and 95% quantiles of changes in price for 10 food 
categories under Brexit Deal and No- deal to June 2020 
assuming Brexit had taken place on 29 March 2019. 
These were aggregated based on the accuracy and 
informativeness of the experts on calibration questions.
Participants Ten specialists with expertise in food 
procurement, retail, agriculture, economics, statistics and 
household food security.
results When combined in proportions used to calculate 
Consumer Price Index food basket costs, median food 
price change for Brexit with a Deal is expected to be 
+6.1% (90% credible interval −3% to +17%) and with No- 
deal +22.5% (90% credible interval +1% to +52%).
Conclusions The number of households experiencing 
food insecurity and its severity is likely to increase 
because of expected sizeable increases in median food 
prices after Brexit. Higher increases are more likely than 
lower rises and towards the upper limits, these would 
entail severe impacts. Research showing a low food 
budget leads to increasingly poor diet suggests that 
demand for health services in both the short and longer 
terms is likely to increase due to the effects of food 
insecurity on the incidence and management of diet- 
sensitive conditions.
IntrODuCtIOn
Food insecurity, the lack of access to sufficient 
nutritious food, is associated with multiple 
negative outcomes including diet- sensitive 
chronic diseases. An important driver of 
household food security is the costs of food 
and other essentials relative to incomes. In 
2016, the UK voted to relinquish its member-
ship of the European Union (EU), known 
colloquially as ‘Brexit’, to be completed by 
29 March 2019. UK reliance on food imports, 
including from EU, is significant and food 
price rises have been widely forecast.1
One of the motivations for investigating 
possible impacts of Brexit on food prices is 
that, over the last few years, medical general 
practitioners in the UK have raised concerns 
about food insecure patients seeking refer-
rals to food banks2 and that food insecurity is 
affecting medication compliance, health and 
well- being.3 This has raised concern about 
resource implications for surgeries4 and that 
‘the welfare system is failing to provide a 
robust last line of defence against hunger’.5
A 2017 survey showed 13% of people were 
worried that their food would run out before 
they got money to buy more (‘marginally food 
secure households’) and 8% could not afford 
to eat balanced meals or went hungry (‘low 
or very low food secure households’).6 In 
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low- income households, 29% experience food insecurity.7 
Lower income households inevitably allocate a higher 
proportion of spending on food, and buy a similar frac-
tion of imported food; therefore, low- income households 
are more exposed to food price rises. In November 2018, 
the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights special rapporteur issued a statement in 
which he argued that the rise in food bank use in the UK 
is a consequence of poverty, including in- work poverty. 
He recommended that the UK government should begin 
to measure and monitor food security.8
Absolute income levels and volatility are both important 
drivers of household food insecurity.9 10 There was little 
growth in real earnings in 2017–2018, and the Office for 
Budget Responsibility forecast slow earnings growth for 
the following 4 years.11 This means that the main driver 
of household food insecurity will be food price. UK price 
inflation is measured by changes in the UK Consumer 
Price Index (CPI). The CPI is based on a ‘shopping 
basket’ of goods and services, including a food element. 
In November 2018, the CPI inflation was 2.3% per annum 
over all items and 0.5% p.a. for the food element.12 The 
CPI is based on actual consumer spending and the food 
element incorporates both spending on healthy nutrition 
and on less healthy options. CPI alone cannot indicate if 
consumers are shifting towards less healthy diets because 
confounding effects are smoothed out across income 
ranges.
Consequences of food insecurity on diet- sensitive 
chronic diseases, including hypertension, hyperlipi-
daemia and diabetes,13–19 are significant. Other effects 
include poor educational attainment, poor mental 
health and social isolation, which increase mortality.20 
People on lower incomes report shopping for cheaper 
foods and eating less,6 eating more high- fat, salty, sugar- 
sweetened foods and processed meat.21 Fruit and vege-
table consumption is lower in low- income households.22 
The medical importance of a basic nutritional safety net 
has long been recognised by policymakers through the 
Welfare Food Scheme and Healthy Start programmes. A 
recent systematic review identifies poor diet quality as an 
important preventable risk factor for non- communicable 
disease, responsible for one- in- five deaths globally and 
127 deaths per 100 000 Britons.23 Under post-2008 
austerity measures, cuts have been made to Healthy Start 
and other provisions. The UK’s main response to growing 
food insecurity has been charitable food relief, but the 
efficacy of these and similar approaches is unmeasured. 
Social protection spending and welfare state interven-
tions are the only actions known to alter the prevalence of 
household food insecurity.24 The rise in food bank use is 
attributed largely to welfare cuts.4 Despite the purported 
end of austerity, the inability of some households to feed 
themselves adequately persists. Figures from The Trussell 
Trust, the UK’s largest network of food banks, show 1 583 
668 three- day emergency food supplies were issued in the 
12 months to 31 March 2019, an increase of 19% over the 
same period in 2018.25
The UK is deeply integrated with the EU and its deci-
sion to exit from this trading block has no parallel in 
modern history.26 Almost one- half of the UK’s food is 
imported: 30% comes from the EU, and another 11% 
comes from non- EU countries under the terms of trade 
deals negotiated by the EU. Prices of fruits and vegetables 
are particularly vulnerable to vagaries of production and 
supply.1 In estimates of the economic impact of Brexit 
on the UK, the least damaging scenarios are those which 
are closest to the current situation under EU member-
ship (ie, retaining membership of the Single Market and 
Customs Union), while a ‘no- deal’ scenario is predicted 
to be the most damaging.27
In setting a comprehensive strategy for the UK to ensure 
household food security, policymakers must grapple 
with how to prioritise low food prices, animal welfare, 
minimum income, health, welfare and social protection.
In anticipation of Brexit in March 2019, we conducted 
an elicitation of a group of experts in July 2018 on their 
expectations for possible impacts of two Brexit scenarios 
on food prices over the 14 months following Brexit (ie, 
to June 2020). This period was chosen to recognise that 
there is a period of transition to any new regime and that 
what we are interested in is what post- Brexit food prices 
will settle to after the initial volatility. Experts were asked 
to integrate into their judgements all factors relevant to 
the changing of food prices at current exchange rates.
MethODS
A projection of food prices gives a key insight into the 
effects of unprecedented events on household food secu-
rity and contingent health consequences. As far as we 
know, no projections have been published for the impact 
of Brexit on food prices or CPI which enumerate asso-
ciated uncertainties formally. That said, one new study 
has estimated potential impacts of Brexit on the prices of 
fruits and vegetables and the uncertainties in these using 
Monte Carlo simulation.28 Other studies provided only 
point estimates. We report key findings from the appli-
cation of a structured expert judgement (SEJ) elicitation 
to potential food price changes and their uncertainties in 
the event of Brexit under two scenarios: ‘Deal’ and ‘No- 
deal’. By Brexit Deal we mean with trading arrangements 
broadly similar to the present. With Brexit No- deal we 
mean that such arrangements will be discontinued and 
individual trade deals would need to be negotiated.
Since SEJ involves the combination of expert judgement, 
diversity of experts is more important than large numbers. 
Literature supports 8–15 experts as a viable number in 
practice; having greater numbers may not significantly 
impact the findings and would incur extra expense and 
time. Having fewer than five experts reduces the pros-
pect of providing adequate diversity of views and could 
weaken the strength of the inferences.29 We identified 
potential experts through literature search and scanning 
web pages of relevant organisations. We sent invitations to 
43 individuals whose expertise represented a wide range 
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within the domain. Of these, only six were able to spend 
3 days at the elicitation workshop, so we rescheduled and 
sent out another tranche of 67 invitations. Again only six 
could commit to the workshop, so we rescheduled once 
more, expanded our list of potential experts and issued 
81 invitations. Following this iteration, we decided to go 
ahead with the six external experts and supplement the 
panel with additional academic colleagues. Two external 
experts were then late withdrawals from the panel, so we 
added two more academic volunteers with relevant exper-
tise bring the panel up to 10 specialists in all. Our panel 
(see the Acknowledgements section) had expertise in 
food procurement, retail, agriculture, economics, statis-
tics and household food security, and each expert consid-
ered potential impacts of the Brexit scenarios on prices 
separately for each of 10 food categories that are used 
in the UK CPI. We then used these results to explore a 
number of scenarios.
Structured expert judgement
SEJ elicitation provides a formal approach for estimating 
uncertain quantities according to current professional 
knowledge and understanding, and has been used in a 
wide range of applications. To amalgamate our experts’ 
judgements, we used Cooke’s Classical Model, a well- 
established, validated approach.30–33 Cooke’s method 
uses a mathematical scoring rule basis to evaluate empir-
ical performance- based weights for aggregating indi-
vidual experts’ judgements. This means that when all the 
individual estimates are combined, the experts who were 
most informative and most accurate on a set of related 
calibration questions (to which only the analysts had the 
answers) contributed most to the final estimates of the 
questions of interest.34
The independent facilitator (WA) devised calibration 
questions based on historic food price changes. The 
questions of interest were future food price changes. We 
began by discussing with the group the wordings and 
meanings of the questions, to minimise ambiguities or 
misunderstandings. The experts themselves then clari-
fied and revised several of the target questions.
For both calibration and target questions, we asked 
the experts to integrate, within their judgements, all the 
factors and circumstances under which food prices could 
be driven up or down. Each expert provided their own 
estimates, confidentially to the facilitator (WA), for the 
lowest plausible, highest plausible and best estimate for 
price change for each food category under the specific 
scenario. We discussed with the experts that we would 
treat their three judgement values for each item in the 
subsequent analysis as analogous to a 90% credible 
interval range, with their best estimate value representing 
the median of their uncertainty spread. We made clear 
that a median value need not necessarily be central to the 
credible interval if, in the expert’s judgement, the rele-
vant uncertainty distribution is not symmetric and should 
exhibit skewness (either to higher or lower values). More 
details are given in online supplementary information file 
S1.
This confidential elicitation procedure encourages 
participants to express judgements based on their true 
beliefs, reducing potential sources of bias due to peer and 
group influences. We also maintained anonymity when 
presenting to the group the individual judgements and 
weights derived from the calibration questions.
Analysis of elicitation
We aggregated mathematically individual uncertainty 
distributions for each food category to construct food 
price change probability density functions, using the 
performance- based weights derived from the expert cali-
bration step in the Cooke’s Classical Model.30
We processed our experts’ responses using the program 
EXCALIBUR,35 36 which computes weighted combina-
tions of judgements and produces a synthesis for each 
food item expressed in terms of the same three quantiles 
used in the elicitation (ie, 5th, 50th and 95th percen-
tiles). We report in the next section both the overall food 
price change using the category weights employed by the 
CPI and those for a healthy basket based on MacMahon 
and Weld.37
Computing brexit-related food basket cost changes
In order to estimate price change distributions for 
different shopping baskets under the two Brexit scenarios 
we use the Bayes Net (BN) code UNINET.38 BNs are 
graphical tools for representing and computing high- 
dimensional joint uncertainty distributions.39 40 Our BN 
for calculating food basket price changes post- Brexit is 
shown in figure 1.
In postprocessing the elicitation data it was recognised 
that implicit correlations existed between certain food-
stuff prices in the judgements of many of the experts. 
Ideally, such correlations need to be accounted for in an 
uncertainty analysis to avoid creating spurious results; 
here, to mitigate their absence, we adopted approxi-
mate correlation values from our knowledge of foodstuff 
pricing.
The converse assumption, that food prices are inde-
pendent, introduces the risk of underestimating the joint 
extent of inter- related changes on distribution tails.
Vegetable and fruit prices are correlated by a mutual 
dependency on weather conditions. However, both 
within and between food categories there can be differen-
tial effects on different crops: for example, spring floods 
which rot potatoes and delay grain sowing do no harm to 
orchards, which suffer if there is an unseasonal frost as 
the fruit is setting. We set this correlation at about +0.75
Corn and sugar beet are used as feed for cattle, 
inducing a correlation between meat and grain (bread), 
and between meat and sugar; we set these correlations 
each at +0.4. While dairy and beef cattle markets are 
quite distinct, their prices are linked through a common 
dependency on feed costs, so we link milk and meat with 
a correlation +0.4.
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Figure 1 Bayes Net structure for calculating distributions for food basket price changes (ellipses with black ends) due to 
elicited judgements on individual foodstuff price movements under Brexit Deal and No- deal scenarios: percentage change 
in CPI food basket cost; cost change in £ for CPI food basket, and for two household baskets. The information nodes in the 
upper half of the Bayes Net (Bread, Meat, and so on) comprise uncertainty distributions on price movements per foodstuff for 
the Brexit Deal scenario; the nodes in the lower half (BreadX, MeatX, and so on) represent uncertainty judgements for foodstuff 
price movements under a Brexit No- deal scenario. The quantified changes in the basic CPI basket(s) are factored with Office 
for National Statistics foodstuff weights (node ‘Wts’). Numerical distribution statistics for the output nodes are summarised in 
table 1 (see online supplementary information file S2 for further details). CPI, Consumer Price Index.
Grain (bread) and sugar (beet) can both be feedstock 
for biofuel and thus are linked via oil price; to account 
for this and other, secondary joint correlations, we set 
this correlation to +0.72. In fact, all food prices are linked 
to oil price through production and transport costs, but 
these two more strongly.
The 2016 ‘sugar tax’ saw food producers make a substan-
tial switch to artificial sweeteners, smaller serving sizes, 
and so on, to avoid significant price rises being passed 
to the consumer. In light of this, we set the correlation 
between sugar and soft drinks to a relatively low value of 
+0.3.
reSultS
We present estimated projected price changes by June 
2020, assuming Brexit on 29 March 2019, using food price 
change quantiles elicited at food category level (table 1). 
We use the BN in figure 1 to combine these price changes 
and associated uncertainties for the food element of the 
CPI basket, and to estimate monetised equivalents for 
specific family types based on MacMahon and Weld.37 We 
discuss the likely effects on health and the demand for 
health services. The results of the analysis are in table 1 
and are shown graphically in online supplementary figure 
A1. Negative values indicate that the experts judge that, 
under a given scenario, some prices could conceivably go 
down, as well as up, although with low probabilities.
Using the Office for National Statistics food cate-
gory weightings, we aggregate their contributions to a 
CPI basket. We see that, under a Brexit deal, this gives 
expected median food price rises around +6% (ie, a rise 
12 times higher than in 2018) by June 2020, with a plau-
sible, that is, 1- in-20 (5%) likelihood of a drop in prices 
of about −3% or more and a 1- in-20 chance of a rise of 
+17% or more. Under Brexit No- deal, the overall median 
food price escalation is expected to be +23%, with a lower 
plausible increase of about +1% and upper plausible 
increase of about +52% (again, each bound has a 1- in-20 
chance of being exceeded).
Thus, the foreseeable most likely outcome of Brexit is 
significant food price rises. This will lead to more house-
hold food insecurity and its attendant deterioration in 
health and increase in demand for health services.
What-if scenario sensitivity testing
We wished to investigate how sensitive the overall basket 
food cost results are to a single food type. Currently, 
the only UK differentials from global prices are beef 
and poultry, where the EU’s production standards are 
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Table 1 Aggregated food price change estimates
Food category percentage price changes by June 2020 Median (5th, 95th 
percentiles)
CPI category Brexit Deal Brexit No- deal
Soft drinks and so on 6 (0, 26) 8 (0, 47)
Coffee, tea and cocoa 2 (−9, 19) 4 (−5, 69)
Sugar, jam, and so on 7 (−9, 20) 19 (−5, 82)
Vegetables 3 (−10, 20) 9 (−18, 63)
Fruit 5 (−10, 24) 16 (−8, 51)
Oil and fats 5 (−9, 20) 18 (−8, 87)
Milk, cheese and eggs 6 (−9, 20) 23 (−5, 82)
Fish 4 (−9, 19) 5 (−13, 41)
Meat 6 (−10, 29) 18 (−11, 80)
Bread and cereals 4 (−9, 19) 10 (−7, 83)
Overall % change Office for National 
Statistics CPI subfoods, with category 
weights
Mean +6.4%±6.0
Median +6.1% (−2.7 to +16.9)
Mean +24.0%±15.4
Median +22.5%(+1.49 to +51.7)
Food basket cost changes by June 2020 (in £s)
Change in CPI weekly cost relative to 
2018 year- end basket total £58.00*
Mean +£3.78±£3.76
Median +£3.53 (−£1.90 to +£10.41)
Mean +£13.97±£9.52
Median +£13.00 (+£0.08 to +£31.02)
Change in family of 4 healthy food basket 
basis weekly cost £93.56†
Mean +£6.30±£6.71
Median +£5.80 (−£3.68 to +£18.17)
Mean +£22.58±£16.14
Median +£20.98 (−£1.07 to +£50.98)
Change in single pensioner healthy food 
basket basis weekly cost £35.44†
Mean +£2.28±£2.56
Median +£2.09 (−£1.51 to +£6.80)
Mean +£8.11±£6.23
Median +£7.55 (−£1.05 to +£18.99)
‘Brexit deal’ means a deal similar to the present arrangements will be implemented, so little disruption or additional costs to supply routes. 
‘Brexit no- deal’ means that such arrangements will be discontinued and individual trade deals would need to be negotiated. Numerical values 
are medians (90% credible intervals).
*Based on Office for National Statistics Table A2 2018 year- end data (March 2018): selected basket subfood category weekly costs; total for 
the 10 items=£58.00.
†Based on MacMahon and Weld37 Northern Ireland minimum essential healthy basket subfood category weekly costs at November 2014 
Tesco prices. For two adults and two children, one in preschool (aged 2–4) and one in primary school (aged 6–11), total cost for the 10 
items=£93.56; for a single pensioner, the corresponding selected items cost=£35.44.
CPI, Consumer Price Index.
higher than the rest of the world.41 This suggests that 
constraining price rises for these foods following Brexit 
might be achieved principally by lowering animal welfare 
and food hygiene standards, with associated risks to 
human health.
We set cost of meat to its 5th percentile level and then 
its 95th percentile level and investigated the effects on the 
overall food basket cost, with other food types unchanged. 
The resulting changes to the CPI food basket and to the 
family basket cost projections reported in table 2 and 
online supplementary figures A2 and A3.
With meat cost at 5th percentile levels in the elicita-
tion distributions (−10% and −11%, Deal and No- deal, 
respectively, see table 1), the CPI basket mean change for 
Brexit Deal becomes −0.1% (compare +6.4%) and the 
family basket mean cost changes from +£3.78 to −£1.26. 
Under the Brexit No- deal scenario the CPI basket mean 
change would be +8.6% (compare +24.0%) and, for the 
family basket, the cost increase becomes +£5.71 (compare 
+£13.97).
With meat cost at 95th percentile levels from the elic-
itation Deal and No- deal distributions (+29% and +80%, 
respectively), the CPI basket mean change for Brexit Deal 
increases from +6.4% to +13.5% and the family basket 
mean cost rises from +£3.78 to +£14.66. Under the Brexit 
No- deal scenario, the family basket, the mean change 
would be +44.0% (compare +24.0%), the cost increase 
becomes +£44.84 (compare +£13.97).
The mean (expected) CPI basket and family basket 
cost changes would be kept close to zero only if meat 
prices were, somehow, limited to near their projected 5th 
percentile levels—and, with them, the price changes of 
foods correlated with meat were also curbed—and then 
only under the Brexit Deal scenario. Otherwise, higher 
meat prices will inevitably amplify basket cost changes. 
The standard deviations on the means are smaller under 
these meat price sensitivity tests, and the correlation 
structure reduces the kurtosis of the distributions.
Although there are some notable differences in the 
item price compositions of the CPI food basket and 
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Table 2 Example impacts on CPI and family food basket costs from analytical conditioning of the Bayes Net to the 5th and 
95th percentile projected costs of meat, under Brexit Deal and No- deal scenarios
Meat price impacts on food basket mean costs: scenario- based Bayes Net analytical conditioning
Scenario
CPI basket subfoods 
cost: mean 
percentage change*
Family basket: mean 
cost change*
CPI basket subfoods 
cost:
95th percentile 
percentage change*
Family basket:
95th percentile cost 
change*
Meat price → projected 5th percentile cost
Deal (meat cost −10%) −0.1% (+6.4%) −£1.26 (+£3.78) +6.2% (+16.9%) +£5.01 (+£10.41)
No- deal (meat cost −11%) +8.6% (+24.0%) +£5.71 (+£13.97) +24.4% (+51.7%) +£21.13 (+£31.02)
Meat price → projected 95th percentile cost
Deal (meat cost +29%) +13.5% (+6.4%) +£14.66 (+£3.78) +20.6% (+16.9%} +£21.61 (+£10.41)
No- deal (meat cost +80%) +44.0% (+24.0%) +£44.84 (+£13.97) +62.2% (+51.7%) +£61.56 (+£31.02)
*Corresponding base model results are shown in brackets.
CPI, Consumer Price Index.
the family ‘healthy’ food basket (eg, lower spend in 
UK CPI basket on meat: £12.80 vs £30.18 per week for 
Northern Ireland), our analysis shows that the overall cost 
percentage changes in these two representative house-
hold food baskets differ little: for Brexit No- deal, both 
estimates represent about +22% increases in projected 
mean costs.
We selected meat for this sensitivity analysis as it is the 
most likely to change in price depending on the details of 
any trade deals agreed. For other foods or combinations 
of foods, the opposite may apply; similar sensitivity anal-
yses are possible.
The key finding is that the most likely effect of Brexit 
on food prices as calculated using the CPI method is a 
median rise of 6% if there is a deal and 23% if there is 
no deal. These represent significant additional costs for 
household budgets and are highly likely to lead to poorer 
diets with the concomitant effects on diet- related health.
DISCuSSIOn
Principal findings
Food price rises after Brexit are likely to be significant 
and may be substantial and changes will be felt by the 
whole population very quickly.1 In the light of the 
expected stagnation of household incomes, this is likely 
to drive more households into food insecurity. Food is 
a substantial portion of household expenditure, espe-
cially in low- income households.1 MacMahon and Weld37 
found that, after housing and childcare costs, the highest 
category of household expenditure in Northern Ireland 
is on a minimum essential ‘healthy’ food basket. They 
found food costs to be more expensive in rural areas for 
all household types and the highest spend was on meat, 
followed by fruits and vegetables. Those households 
buying most would, of course, incur the greatest actual 
spend increases, with concomitant implications for afford-
ability in terms of differing household- related incomes. 
The well- established links between lower budgets available 
for food and lower diet quality lead to the expectation 
of multiple negative outcomes. Nutrient- dense foods, 
such as fruits and vegetables, are often more expensive 
and less available in lower income neighbourhoods when 
compared with processed foods. Processed foods are 
generally inexpensive and highly accessible. They are 
energy dense, high in added fats, sugar, or salt and often 
considered highly palatable with addictive potential.21 
Increasing numbers of patients with this kind of diet will 
likely drive increases in the incidence of diet- sensitive 
chronic diseases in the longer term, such as hypertension, 
hyperlipidaemia and diabetes.13–19 The downturn in fruit 
and vegetable intake has been estimated between 2.5% 
and 11.4%, dependent on the Brexit trade agreement, 
with increasing cardiovascular disease mortality.28 This, in 
turn, will drive increased demands on the health services. 
In the short term, this might manifest in reduced control 
of existing chronic conditions such as diabetes, coeliac 
disease and hypertension, leading to demand on front- 
line and general practice services.
Strengths and weaknesses of the study
One strength of our analysis is that the expert judgement 
median estimates we obtain by elicitation are consistent 
with central estimates produced by UK Trade Policy 
Observatory and by the British Retail Consortium1 and 
other modelling studies.28 However, we add further infor-
mation for decision support by presenting quantified 
uncertainties around our estimates. These spreads can be 
substantial and all exhibit skew in the form of extended, 
‘heavy’ upper tails—that is, larger price increases are 
more likely than smaller increases (or reductions). 
Related decision- making that is based only on central 
(average) estimates and neglects these uncertainties can 
lead to poor policy selection.42
Policymakers benefit from consideration of a defined 
reasonable worst case for contingency planning, and are 
proficient at interpreting probabilistic statements, which 
help clarify underlying assumptions.43 Moreover, historic 
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vegetable CPI rises offer a perspective for the elicited cred-
ible intervals for CPI vegetable price change in table 1. 
The largest historic 1- year change in vegetable prices 
since 1987 was +14.8% (2006–2007) and the largest 2- year 
jump was +27.1%, for the period 2006–2008. Compared 
with the Brexit Deal scenario, the record of 2- year rise is 
greater than the elicited 95th percentile vegetable price 
index change (ie, +20% by June 2020, 2 years ahead from 
the elicitation), and falls within the 90% credible interval 
for Brexit No- deal; the projected 95th percentile change 
could exceed +63% under this scenario. One weakness of 
the study was that we had fewer than the optimal number 
of experts. While the spread of expertise was good, a 
wider spread of expertise could have improved quanti-
fication of price changes, possibly narrowing the uncer-
tainty around the central estimates.
Strengths and weaknesses in relation to other studies
Although updating is warranted, our likely price change 
projections exemplify a basis for undertaking a detailed 
modelling of impacts on health and healthcare provision 
under the two alternative Brexit scenarios. Most attempts 
to quantify food prices after Brexit have not been set 
within the context of health and healthcare provision, 
nor have they quantified the uncertainty in such esti-
mates; one notable exception is the estimation of the 
potential impacts of fruit and vegetable price increases 
on cardiovascular disease.28 While the experience of food 
insecurity is largely driven by the cost of food and other 
essentials relative to incomes, other factors such as self- 
efficacy, access to credit and other forms of social capital 
are also significant.44
MeAnIng Of the StuDy
The likely effect of Brexit, under either scenario, is a 
significant rise in food prices. Unless the rising tide of 
food insecurity is reversed, health costs will continue to 
rise with implications for health and clinician workloads. 
Our findings should alert policymakers to the poten-
tial for significant increases in food costs under either 
Brexit scenario, with major impacts likely to follow a 
No- deal outcome. The expected levels of these increases 
and, more importantly, the uncertainty spreads on the 
estimates—all of which are skewed moderately towards 
higher costs—should inform policies that allow house-
holds to afford minimum essential food baskets, meeting 
acceptable physical, psychological and social needs. One 
likely corollary to substantial post- Brexit food price rises 
is even greater consumption of cheaper, less healthy diets, 
with inevitable impacts on population long- term health 
trends and demands on the National Health Service. 
Medical practitioners and healthcare workers are among 
those who will have to confront the related challenges 
if food prices rise sharply and substantially after Brexit. 
Clinicians may need to organise processes to cope with 
the demand from food insecure patients for referrals to 
food banks. The management of chronic conditions may 
deteriorate, increasing the need for intervention. Food 
insecurity in the present may also increase healthcare 
demand in the longer term. Policies that support incomes 
and access to food are the only interventions that have 
a demonstrable positive effect on food insecurity. It is 
incumbent on policymakers to ensure that the last line 
of defence against hunger is robust in order to promote 
well- being, productivity and healthy ageing.
Current evidence on the efficacy of some of the most 
widespread current responses to food insecurity, such as 
food banks, is limited. More research is needed in order 
to select the most effective strategies for supporting 
health and well- being. While Brexit did not take place 
by the due date, and the overall political situation is now 
even less clear than before, certain aspects of potential 
impacts on food supplies have become more explicit. For 
example, the impact of stockpiling on non- perishable 
food prices can be now ascertained more accurately, as 
those costs can be quantified. In other respects, however, 
uncertainties associated with post- Brexit food pricing 
have increased.
unanswered questions and future research
Given almost everything concerning Brexit is in a state of 
flux at the time of writing, it is our intention to conduct an 
updating elicitation, once the circumstances surrounding 
how Brexit will be implemented become clearer. Experts 
who participated in our 2018 elicitation have expressed 
a universal interest in revisiting the issues and factors, 
and in reviewing their judgements of future food prices 
and the related uncertainties. We will consider increasing 
membership of the panel of experts to obtain an even 
wider sample of judgements. One advantage of this 
repeat elicitation would be the opportunity to investigate 
how much the quantified uncertainties, reported here, 
may have changed. When we know the terms of Brexit, an 
elicitation update will be able to quantify possible adjust-
ments to the present estimates. In addition, we intend to 
explore in more quantitative detail possible underlying 
correlations between prices of different foodstuffs. New 
advances in elicitation techniques for assessing parameter 
dependencies45 offer a ratifiable basis for quantifying the 
properties of such correlations. It seems inevitable that 
the implications of an eventual Brexit for projected food 
price forecasts will be fundamental to, and crucial for 
policy planning in many societal and political areas.
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